Come join the Study Small Group

Welcoming into the muddled firmament of CCP education tools, Study Small Group (Xuexi Xiaozu) (SSG), a recent arrival in Wechat world supposedly set up by someone very, very close to Xi Jinping. It’s meant as a way of getting the Great Leader’s message out, directly and simply, to the Party faithful. At times it reads as if it’s the boss himself sounding off, outside the binds of official Party documents, which he must know from all his years, everyone hates reading.

I’ve spent a little time recently reading its daily output. It’s pretty awful, of course, but compared to the Study the Strong Country (Xuexi Qiangguo) app materials, which can kill at less than five paces, it is positively Mad Men in its propaganda velvetyness. And as far as I can tell there’s no score-50-points-this-month-or-you’ll-be-fired quota system behind it. Recently SSG has been running a campaign against “formalism” (excuse the translation of xingshi zhuyi; all complaints to Pleco), which is a term for all the many ills of bureaucracy. I thought I’d translate a summary article that was sent to local cadres.

It reads weirdly. But, believe me, it’s not (entirely) my fault. I admit I have no special translation talent or training, but in my defense, the original piece has loads of run-on sentences, as though it’s a transcript of someone (see above) not very organized talking. The examples it provides are always vague, and sometimes do not really match the point being made. The piece drifts; there’s a lot not doing this or that, not much on what you should do. I guess that partly they’ve chosen this style as they think its more easily read and understood by local cadres. I’ve added the Chinese when I’m feeling pretentious and when, at least to my ear, the words have special resonance. Say, for instance, chuxin, given it’s part of that infamous slogan.

I think we can take away a few lessons.

First, General Secretary Xi Jinping is very much annoyed with all the “formalism” that’s rampant out there – the term covers everything from laziness, gaming the system, ordering your subordinates to do useless work, and only superficially fulfilling Beijing’s wishes. Instead, the not-so-great helmsman wants you “rectifying and reforming’ all day, every day.

Of course, battling bureaucracy is the necessary and never-ending battle of any bureaucracy. Mao fought this battle, so did Deng; both are quoted in this piece; Jiang and Hu no doubt did too, but no one gives a about them these days, so no mention of them.

Second, they’ve found no effective way to stop it. They know the points system (kaohe zhi) can be gamed. Without bribes to motivate bureaucrats, and of course without any external oversight or voting system, there’s only really ideology and threats left. So, third, life as a local cadre is pretty miserable. The incomparable Pei Minxin made this same observation just recently here. And he pointed out that despite the lack of high-profile arrests recently, punishments for small offenses continue to rack up.

But neither ideology or threats will work. Threats just stop risk-averse people doing anything. And ideology probably makes things worse; it deadens the mind, wastes hours a week in pointless “study” sessions, and most importantly it never provides any realistic guidance on what you’re supposed to do. Read the translation with an eye for what you, as a district party secretary is supposed to now do. You’ll be none the wiser.

And the situation has gotten even more ridiculous in recent months. The Propaganda Department bureaucrats set up the Xuexi Qianguo app (with their Alibaba contractors), which really annoyed the Organization Department bureaucrats, who in theory are in charge of cadre development. I don’t know, but I’d bet a case of Wuliangye that the Organization bureaucrats are now planning their own education extravaganza. And into this morass now wanders Xuexi Xiaozu. It sounds at times like a leader fuming. There’s that old saw about Chinese politics that the Party has both thumbs (for brutally stamping down on bad things) AND fingers (for sorting gppd things out smartly) (Daniel Koss’s book is really good on the Party’s efficacy here). But this missive certainly does not feel like sophisticated fingers are at work.

Fourth, what happens next? Will Xi ultimately become so frustrated that he’ll decide to do a Mao and attempt to destroy his own bureaucracy? I think the odds are low – he’s a man of order and control (I considered this question here). But if his continued efforts to coral his 10mn cadres fails, what does he do? I do not know.

So here we go with the SSG missive….

The Central Committee has made this year as the year of reducing the burden on grassroots cadres, and has issued lots of policies and rules, from the centre and from localities. But formalism is still a chronic disease in the development of the Party. Recently the Study Small Group has issued ten pieces on reducing the grassroots burden. Today, we try to take from these pieces and online comments to provide some advice.

Performance: Rudimentary, Childish, Useless, Wasteful use of money. When we say formalism is an chronic disease, it is because its always been a shadow over the historical development of the Party. In the revolutionary war, after the failure of the Jinggan August Struggle, Mao Zedong wrote a report to the Central Committee sternly criticizing Hunan province’s representative, Du Xiujing. “He didn’t check the current environment, he only knew how to how to bureaucratically follow the Hunan province committees’ orders”, and he seriously harmed the struggle in Hunan and Jiangxi provinces. “His mistakes were extremely serious”.

In 1972, when Nixon visited China, there was a day when the temperature dropped to zero, several villagers were by the side of the road, playing chess with their heads down, even when the US president and first lady arrived, they did not move. Nixon said, “This is organized for us to see”. When Zhou Enlai heard about it later, he told Nixon, candidly, “We have a few ways of doing things which are a bit dishonest, it’s formalism’.

At the beginning of 1992, Deng Xiaoping on his Southern Tour said sternly, “We now have a problem. It’s too much formalism. Once I turn on the TV it’s full of meetings. There are loads of meetings, the documents are too long, the speeches are too long, and the content is repeated, theres’s no new language. We have to repeat the same words, but we should simplify. Formalism is also bureaucratism.”

Loads of meetings, loads of inspections, loads of filing in forms. Some “leader has a meeting, the secretary has all the hard work”. There’s even the phenomenon when the secretary writes better quality content than the leader. Some grassroots inspections don’t even understand the grassroots. Whatever the leader says that’s the end of the matter. “One person does the work, three people watch, six people inspect”. Some reforms don’t do anything concrete. Also, the reform content in reports is just copy and pasted. They even‘put Zhang’s hat on Li’s head [i.e. attribute to the wrong person]. Some cadres don’t assume responsibility. But they hanker after making a superficial show. Even in poor areas, they just spend money paint the walls white. Al these types of formalism, Party Secretary Xi Jinping has sternly criticized. “Don’t eat, don’t dress up, don’t do these useless tasks and waste the country’s money.”

As the times develop, information technology is increasingly commonly used, but formalism has turned up in few new places. Those technologies should have made it easier to do work and innovate have become burdens. They’ve introduced app download targets, some have hassled stay-behind old people who can’t use smartphones to download apps. Some cadres have a few dozen work chat-groups, they have an “avoid trouble model”, but they cant escape life.

Some departments spend more than half their budget on A4 paper; there’s a cadre who hasn’t graduated for long, he’s got a 128G memory card, full of photos. No matter if it’s old or new, Chairman Mao’s comment hits the nail on the head: formalism does greater harm. “It’s a childish, low-level, tacky, mindless thing”.

“Grassroots formalism is not fundamentally from the grassroots, it’s handed down from on high. I spent seven years as a farmer, the biggest take-away is that when ordinary people see a cadre they know whether he’s real or not, ordinary people are afraid of no content, doing nothing real.” Formalism’s danger we know, we are clear on it’s appearance, but why it is always coming back? Xi Jinping hits the nail on the head: “to rectify formalism, bureaucratism, the top leader needs to take responsibility”.

From this years’ revelations of classic cases, formalism, bureaucratism, its rampant in some places, units, and departments. In these places, units, departments, it’s connected with the leaders, especially the big leader, this year, in a rare event, a circular criticized a deputy governor cadre who did formalism, and this study group has written about this case in a recent piece. He painted the walls white in a poverty county, and planned to spend RMB 600,000 on “lifting out of poverty” propaganda movie. A local farmer said it right, “they came to paint white walls four times, doesn’t this cost money?”

There are also some cadres, they pervert senior/junior relationships as one way of displaying power. If you don’t leave work, your juniors are not allowed to leave either. Before leaving work, you’ll do an inspection tour of everyone in the office or some will wait till its almost leaving-work time, or at the weekend, and they’ll come up with tasks. If things go on like his, “if the leader doesn’t leave, I can’t leave, it gradually becomes the way of doing things (qian guize), it evolves into wasteful overtime. Deng Xiaoping once noted that when formalism runs amuck, it results in staff “work style becoming superficial, inefficient, and directly influences reform and construction’s smooth progress”.

Our survey found that the large majority of group members detest formalism, but it exists near them, why does formalism still have such a market, it’s like smelly doufu, it smells rotten, but tastes good, it reflects misplaced attitude to political achievement.

First of all, it’s giving up responsibility. “Prefer to arrange mistakes, definitely don’t divulge”, just want to appear to have finished “raising questions’ then it’s OK, whether you’re able to reform, need to reform, that’s what the grassroots cadre needs to think about, even have to regularly send repots up about lightening the grassroots’ burden, and thereby you increase the burden. And lots of grassroots cadres get forced into wasteful overtime, that’s in line with the idea of working hard, but its actually masquerading as hard work, but in the quantitative performance system, cadres can use this as a pretext, to run from responsibility, more common, is all types of “leave-a-mark-ism” (liuhen zhuyi), i.e. the grassroots govern, almost just becomes “box governance” (hezi zhili), everything has an accounting book, things are not important, but the report materials are very thick, some poverty village, they had to make space for a room for the Anti-poverty Struggle accounts. Behind all this, its all about leaving a mark/impression on senior cadres, but in the hearts of the ordinary people, there’s no impression to find, its deviation from our original aspiration (chuxin)

Also, there is issue of political achievements (zhengji). “The success doesn’t have to be mine” ought to be the Party cadres’ bottom-line, but there’s a limit on office terms, and formalism doesn’t need as much time, it’s easy to make up “political achievements, lots of officials make a move, for instance, a village specially invited a retired teacher from a party school to dress up and make [its reports] elegant, the result was that the village was first place in the district, it was the best result in that village’s history. One fallen district party sectary, he went to the poverty village but didn’t go into any homes, he took business people to see projects, used all his energy and funds on high-end projects.

Doing formalism is safe, real innovation carries risks. When it did its investigations in the grassroots, the SSG found a weird thing. A cadre doing compensation for demolished home (chaiqian anzhi) got talked about all over the city, but because he dared to confront and offend quite a few people, he was followed, threatened, and reported. In the eyes of the leaders, he was an able cadre, but he was also a “create trouble” kind of person. To promote him is like having a bomb next to you which can go off at any time. “When it comes to promoting him, leaders are certain to think twice.”

And there the missive ends. It is ironic in the extreme that the piece ends admitting that good cadres are doomed to never be promoted and that the system is therefore broken. Here’s the Chinese:

中央确定今年为基层减负年以来,从中央到地方,也出台了不少政策规定,但形式主义是党的建设发展长期面临的一个顽疾,想毕其功于一役也很困难。

近期,学习小组陆续发布了10篇针对基层减负的文章,今天我们试着从这些文章和网友的评论里,为当前的基层减负支支招。

表现:低级、幼稚、无用功、浪费钱 我们说形式主义是个顽疾,是因为党的发展历史中一直都有它的影子。 在革命战争时期,井冈山斗争“八月失败”后,毛泽东在给中共中央的报告中严厉批评了当时湖南省委代表杜修经“不察当时环境”“只知形式地执行湖南省委的命令”,给湘赣两省根据地斗争造成严重损失,“其错误实在非常之大”。 1972年,尼克松访华,有一天气温降到零下,几个“村民”却在路边一直低头下棋,甚至对总统夫妇的到来也无动于衷。尼克松说了一句:“这是安排给我们看的。”周恩来知道后很坦率地对尼克松说:“我们有些做法比较虚假,是形式主义。” 1992年初,邓小平在南巡时严厉地说:“现在有一个问题,就是形式主义多。电视一打开,尽是会议。会议多,文章太长,讲话也太长,而且内容重复,新的语言并不很多。重复的话要讲,但要精简。形式主义也是官僚主义。”

会议多、检查多、填表多,有的“领导开会,秘书受罪”,甚至有秘书写材料的水平比领导还高的现象;有的下基层检查却不懂基层,领导说什么就是什么,“一个人干,三个人看,六个人查”;有的整改不做实事,而是在整改材料上“复制粘贴”,甚至“张冠李戴”;有的干部不担当,却热衷做表面文章,甚至还有的贫困地区花钱刷白墙。以上种种形式主义,习近平总书记曾严厉批评:“不能吃不能穿,搞这些无用功,浪费国家的钱!”

随着时代发展,信息技术的广泛应用,形式主义还产生了一些变种,有些本应为了更好推动工作的创新却成了新的负担。有的为了各种APP安装率达标,折腾那些不会用手机的留守老人;有的干部手机上几十个工作群,“免打扰”模式也回避不了对生活的切割;有的部门A4纸的支出占了一大半,干部毕业时间不长,一部128G内存的手机被照片占满了。

无论是老的还是新的,毛主席的这句点评都可谓一针见血:形式主义害死人,是一种“幼稚的、低级的、庸俗的、不动脑筋”的东西。

根源 “基层的形式主义,根源不在下面,而是上行下效……我当了7年农民,最大体会就是老百姓看干部就看实在不实在,老百姓就怕空洞无物、不干实事。”

形式主义的危害我们知道,表现我们清楚,为何总是反复发作?习近平一针见血:纠正形式主义、官僚主义,一把手要负总责。

从近年来曝光的典型案例看,形式主义、官僚主义之所以在一些地方、单位、部门大行其道,与这些地方、单位、部门的领导干部特别是一把手有很大关系。今年,中央罕见地通报批评一名副省级干部搞形式主义,小组也在系列文章中专门提了这件事,该地“刷白墙”扶贫,还计划60万拍脱贫宣传片,其中一名村民说的很实在:“一年又刷又刮来了四次,这不费钱吗?”

还有些领导干部,将扭曲的上下级关系变成了展现权力的一种方式。自己不下班,下属也不许下班;下班前,还会各个办公室巡视一遍;有的临下班或者周末前,临时布置任务……长此以往,“领导不走我不走”渐渐成为潜规则,竟衍生出了“摸鱼式”加班这个异类,邓小平曾指出形式主义的横行,直接导致“工作人员作风漂浮,效率低下,直接影响改革和建设事业的顺利进行。”

我们的问卷调查发现,大部分组员都对搞形式主义深恶痛绝,但是大部分人身边却都存在着形式主义,为何形式主义这么有市场,它跟臭豆腐有个相同点,闻着臭,吃着却香,折射的是错位的政绩观:

首先是能免责。“宁肯列错、绝不漏过”,只要体现完成“提出问题”的责任就好,是否能够整改、需要整改,这是基层需要考虑的,甚至还要定期上报“基层减负”的各种材料,把减负变增负。而很多基层被动进行“摸鱼式”加班、“表演式”加班,本着“没有功劳也有苦劳”的想法,虽然属于滥竽充数,但是在数量化考核下,干部可以借此免责。更多更常见的就是各种“留痕”主义,基层治理几乎变成了“盒子治理”——事事有台账,事不大,但材料要厚,某贫困村,非得腾出一个房间来放脱贫攻坚的台账。这些现象的背后,其实是为了给上级印象留了痕,而在百姓心里却无迹可寻,背离了我们的初心。

另外就是有政绩。“功成不必在我”是党员干部应有的境界,但任期时间有限,做形式主义工作花费的时间短,容易出“政绩”,很多官员就动了心,某村专门聘请一个党校退休教授做包装和文字方面的工作,结果该村在乡镇综合排名拿到第一名,是该村有史以来的最好成绩。某落马的县委书记,扶贫进村不入户,领着商人看项目,把精力和资金都集中到“高大上”的项目上。

搞形式主义安全,真创新却有风险。小组在基层调研时遇到的一个怪事。一个干部在拆迁安置上的一个创新得到了全市推广,但也因为敢于碰硬得罪了不少人,被跟踪、威胁、投诉举报。在领导眼中,他既是能人,也是一个“会惹麻烦的人”,“提拔他就相当于是在自己身边放了一颗随时会爆炸的炸弹。”在提拔他时,领导不得不考虑再三。

久而久之,庸者上、优者下、能者汰,党和人民事业还怎么向前发展?

办法 “上面千条线,下面一根针”,很多形式主义问题,占用基层干部大量时间、耗费大量精力,这种状况必须改变! ——习近平

十篇系列文章,针对这些问题,也提出了一些意见建议。小组梳理发现,其实都包含在了中办那份《关于解决形式主义突出问题为基层减负的通知》里的几个方面了。

一是政绩观,这里中央提到一个典型案例,就是秦岭北麓西安境内违建别墅问题。说到这,我们不得不提三十年前,习近平任宁德地委书记时的清房工作,当时情况严重到什么程度?全区7392名干部营建私房。其中,副县级以上干部242人,科级以上干部1399人,分别占这两级干部总数的49%和46%。

习近平就问当时的一个纪委副书记:“你觉得老百姓意见大不大?是不是当前影响积极性最大的问题?”当得到肯定回答时,习近平又问:“三百万人该得罪,还是这两三千人该得罪?”习近平想好了:坚决抓到底!

“得罪千百人,不负十三亿。”从地方到中央,习近平说:“不是没有掂量过。但我们认准了党的宗旨使命,认准了人民的期待。”当前的主题教育,也是为各级官员梳理正确政绩观的一次思想武装。

二是解决文山会海的问题。《通知》规定的不可谓不详细,中央印发的政策性文件原则上不超过10页;发给县级以下的文件、召开的会议减少30%—50%;不再层层开会,多采用电视电话、网络视频会议等形式……小组文章也针对这些内容给出了具体建议,归结为一点,就是要提高下文和开会的质量,质量高低如何评价?就要看有没有解决实际问题。

三是解决检查考核过多过频、过度留痕的问题。这里,中办《通知》规定也很细致,包括检查考核的次数,严控“一票否决”事项,不能动辄签“责任状”,不得以工作群、APP上传截图或视频评价工作等等。但小组认为这些要求在具体执行上,是否能不打折扣呢,所有“暗访”检查是否都悄无声息?具体检查的干部是否都对基层问题了如指掌,而不是“清单式”检查、“台账式”检查。

四是问责和激励,这也是最关键的导向问题。正所谓“用一贤人则群贤毕至”,首先问责不能粗线条、一刀切,有的假期自费聚餐被通报,有的洗澡迟接巡查组电话被警告,战战兢兢、如履薄冰,只能让能干事的人投向了看似安全的“形式主义”,改进选人用人工作,根本上要加强和完善基层民主建设,通过民主机制来制约裙带关系和领导干部的个人意志。另外,在激励干部干事创业的同时,要给他们更多的信任。

小组了解到,大部分的基层干部不怕吃苦、不怕受累,也不怕做事,最怕的就是群众的不理解、上级的不信任。

正如一个基层干部对小组说的:“我们都是有责任感的,有些工作为啥不愿去做?领导干部该反思。

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